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SOME OBSERVATIONS UPON UNEASY
AMERICAN FEDERALISM
JEFFERSON

B.

FORDHAMt

Professor Fordham's work first appeared in these pages
overfifty years ago, when he served as Editor-in-Chiefof the
Review. Since that time, he has become a distinguishedlawprofessor and dean, afrequent contributorto legaljournals,and a
prominent member of the American legal community. We are,
therefore, extremely proud to again provide a forum for this
honoredalumnus of our school and our Review. In this Article,
ProfessorFordham explores an issue that hasperplexedour Republic since its beginnings-the relationship between the states
and the federalgovernment. The focus is both historicaland
contemporary in scope, with a provocative analysisof thepossible content and ram/ficationsof afederal constitutionalcon vention.
A half century ago this writer was somewhat preoccupied with a
very special aspect of American federalism. The reference is to the
doctrine of Sw/ft v. Tyson' under which the federal courts, sitting in
diversity of citizenship cases, held themselves not bound by state court
decisions as to state common law or equity involving commercial law
or general jurisprudence. What was found to be particularly troubling
by him and others was the disposition of some lower federal courts to
apply Sw/ft v. Tyson to the interpretation of uniform state laws regarded as in large part codifications of the law merchant and other areas of common law.2 The Supreme Court put a quietus upon that
notion in 1934. 3 Three years later, Sw/ft v. Tyson was overruled.4
The experience just noted gave a modest boost to state autonomy.
It left the states with authoritative voice as to their common law as well
t Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Utah; Dean Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B. 1926, M.A. 1929, J.D. 1929, LL.D. 1953, University of North Carolina;
J.S.D. 1930, Yale University; LL.D. 1960, Franklin & Marshall University; L.H.D. 1970, University of Pennsylvania.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2. See Fordham, The FederalCourts and the Constructionof Uniform State Laws, 7 N.C.L.
Rnv. 423 (1929).
3. Bums Mortgage Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487 (1934).
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

290

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

as to the meaning and application of their own legislation. But it certainly did not confine common law in the United States to the state
sphere. While there is no federal common law of crimes, 5 there are
quite a few patches of federal common law in the civil domain. Notable are the areas of air and water pollution,6 commercial relationships
of the United States,7 and admiralty.8
Federal courts have a creative potential, in the determination of
diversity of citizenship cases, as to state common law in areas that the
state courts have not addressed. One recalls, for example, the case of
Dailey v. Parker,9 in which in the absence of state decisions, the court,
in a diversity case, held that a child may have a cause of action for
alienation of affections of a parent upon whom the child is dependent.
This is not, however, to be identified as a very significant federal role
since the state courts and legislatures do have the competence to articulate the authoritative word.' 0
I.

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIETAL CHANGE

There has been a constitutional revolution in this country that has
taken place and is continuing not so much as a matter of deliberate
change in the organic law but as the relatively uncontrollable effect of
societal change. There is a fluid population enjoying extraordinary
freedom of movement. There are profound changes in values and
moral outlook and in such basic institutions as the family. A very considerable part of the private wealth in the country is invested in private
means of transport and the business units that service them. Economic
production and distribution on a national scale sweep freely over jurisdictional lines. Commercial transactions are standardized in a system
in which such devices as contracts of adhesion are the handmaidens. In
a word, we are served by a national market that strongly promotes
standardization and basic sameness on a national footing.
The reach of the power of Congress to regulate interstate com5. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson, II
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
6. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (pollution); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (air pollution).
7. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
8. The Supreme Court has recognized a common law cause of action for wrongful death in
the realm of admiralty law. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
9. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).

10. This is self-evident; state law is made by constitutional provisions, legislation and judicial
decision.
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merce has come to extend largely over a perceived national market,
subject to an intergovernmental relations qualification fashioned in the
NationalLeague of Cities case in 1976." t

The relatively recent stirring of concern for the nurturing of environmental values and for conservation of natural resources is a signifi-

cant development in American federalism. Federal authority under the
commerce clause is all but pervasive as to both air 2 and water, 13 and

federal influence as to the land component is great.14 Here we are perceiving the conditions of human life in a realistic perspective that inevitably affects political and legal responses.
II.

INTERPRETIVE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES

A point not greatly stressed in law school courses in constitutional

law is that the political branches play responsible roles in constitutional
interpretation. Certainly interpretation is not exclusively for the judicial branch. As a matter of fact, legislative and executive consideration
come first. The executive may press a proposed measure upon the legislative branch and support it with an attorney general's opinion on its
constitutionality. Again, the executive may base a veto upon constitutional grounds, as did Andrew Jackson in vetoing a bill to renew the
charter of the Second Bank of the United States.' 5 Both political
branches may join in the adoption of measures responsive to economic

and social problems with the ultimate question of constitutionality remaining for judicial determination. The fact of legislative and execu-

tive action, therefore, is not to be taken lightly.
11. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In a five to four decision the
Court held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which extended the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Act to unelected employees of states and their
political subdivisions, operated to displace the states' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional government functions such as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation,
public health, and parks and recreation, and that insofar as this is true, the amendments are not
within the authority granted Congress by U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 426 U.S. at 851-52.
12. Federal control over the atmosphere is illustrated by The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. I
1977)).
13. It takes little more than a rill to establish navigability as a basis of federal jurisdiction
under the power to regulate interstate commerce. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504
F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (control over nonnavigable tributaries of navigable streams); United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
14. A considerable part of the land in the continental United States is in the national domain.
As for the rest, there is, for example, jurisdiction to regulate land uses that involve emissions into
the ambient atmosphere, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412 (Supp. 1 1977), or have adverse effects upon
waters under federal jurisdiction, see 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977), and land transactions of an interstate character, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976).
15. See SENATE LIBRARY, PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1789-1976, at 10 (1978).
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As to some questions which may be identified as political questions assigned by the organic law to the political branches, the legislative word is final. 6 But so long as a challenger may get into court,
there remains the judicial responsibility of determining what, as a matter of interpretation, lies in the political sphere.' 7 Thus the role of the
courts is both a very responsible and a strategic one. Legislative resort
to severability clauses certainly recognizes this.
Legislative acknowledgement of judicial review through inclusion
of severability clauses in statutes is a commonplace. The role of severability clauses is, however, fraught with dubiety. In the absence of such
an element, it is reasonable to expect of the judiciary that a statute
considered to be at odds with the federal or state constitution insofar as
a particular provision or application is concerned, be given effect so far
as may be. In this view a severability clause is supererogation. It may
be said of severability clauses, in any event, that they have been used so
freely--even casually-as to leave them in a weak hortatory stance.
This may be noted with emphasis as to a general prospective severability provision in a general interpretation act."'
One must take note of a current impressive perspective of federalism which has been articulated by Professor Jesse H. Choper. He states
his "Federalism Proposal" as follows:
The major thesis of this article, the Federalism Proposal, may be
stated briefly: the federal judiciary should not decide constitutional
questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government
vis-A-vis the states; the constitutional issue whether federal action is
beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates
'states' rights' should be treated as nonjusticiable, with final resolution left to the political branches. Neither this Proposal nor the discussion that follows treats the substantive question whether, in any
given instance, the national government has overreached its delegated authority; the focus instead will be on which branch of government should decide this constitutional issue. 19
Were the Choper "gleam" to be shared by the courts the roles of
the political branches in constitutional exegesis would be immensely
more important. It is to be noted that he is careful to make it plain that

16. The doctrine goes back to Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Note the treatment of the subject in the opinion of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in
which he put the matter in terms of whether there was "textually demonstrable commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department." 1d. at 217.
17. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
18. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.20 (West 1945).
19. Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis-b-Vis the States.- The DispensabiliyofJudicial
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977).
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his proposal would not exclude judicial cognizance of constitutional
questions concerning human rights. It would appear to assign to Congress, however, authoritative determination of a basic concern of this
paper-whether there may be a limited federal constitutional convention. We shall get to that issue in due course.
Meanwhile, it must be observed that the major and distinctive factor in the processes of change and adaptation in American constitutionalism has been judicial review of legislative, executive and
administrative action within the constitutional framework. The Constitution, as will be further noted, is silent as to formal revision. We have
had what amounts to a large measure of revision through judicial exigesis in a changing society, an experience to which reference has already been made. One takes particular note of the commerce power, as
it bears upon a highly interrelated national economy serving a very
mobile society,2 0 and of the post-Civil War amendments as they have
been interpreted to serve, in effect, as safeguards of the first ten amendments' human rights against adverse state action.2 Viewed in world
perspective, this is an extraordinary feature of American society. Appointed federal judges and not elected representatives are making
many of the key decisions.
This experience, one suggests, has tended strongly to obviate any
perceived need for general revision of the Constitution.
III.

IMPORTANCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Another aspect of constitutional law to be noted is the slighting of
state constitutional law in legal education. Of course, there may be
reference to a particular problem but state constitutionalism, broadly
perceived, gets short shrift. One notes that an excellent recent volume
entitled American ConstitutionalLaw accords the state constitutional
dispensation no independent consideration whatever.2" The reader
may wonder what an observation like that is doing in this article. The
explanation is plainly that state constitutional law is both a substantial
component of the constitutional system and something of very real professional significance to lawyers.
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In this case, the Court did not find it necessary to hang interstate freedom of movement upon any particular constitutional provision.
21. See the rationale of Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
22. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
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STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING COMPARED

The unitary character of states as political entities is in marked
contrast with the federal nature of the United States. It is understandable, and experience has demonstrated, that policymaking in the constitutional realm is far more facile at the state than the federal level.
A brief review of what has been done by amendment at the federal
level is in order. There have been twenty-six amendments to the federal constitution, all of which were initiated by Congress. One of them
was by way of repeal of another, which left a net of twenty-four. Of the
twenty-four, over half had to do with human rights (taking voting to be
such). The first ten were almost contemporaneous with the basic instrument and the post-Civil War amendments gave expression to values confirmed by the outcome of the war. The eleventh, provoked by
Chisholm v. Georgia,23 denied federal judicial power to entertain litigation by a citizen of another state or a foreign power against a state. The
twelfth related to the electoral college and House action if there were
no majority vote in the college. The sixteenth, relative to federal income taxation, was not enabling; it simply removed any question as to
congressional power to impose income taxes-whether deemed direct
taxes or not-without apportionment among the states on the basis of
population.24 The seventeenth replaced legislative election of Senators
with popular election. The nineteenth provided for woman suffrage at
state, including local, as well as federal levels. The twentieth fixed the
terms of the President and Vice-President as well as those of members
of both houses of Congress and authorized Congress to provide for the
filling of vacancies. The twenty-first amendment limited a president to
two terms. The twenty-third extended to the District of Columbia
voice in the election of Presidents and Vice-Presidents. The twentyfourth banned requirement of payment of poll or other taxes as a condition to voting for President, Vice-President, or a member of Congress. The twenty-fifth amendment regulated Presidential succession
and the twenty-sixth established an eighteen-year-old voting age for
elections at all levels.
The federal constitution remains a relatively trim organic instrument in contrast with the characteristically explicit and detailed text of
many state constitutions." The latter type of organic instrument is
23. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (standing of a citizen of Georgia to sue the State of Georgia in
a federal court upheld).
24. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
25. A copy does not pad one's pocket.
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more ephemeral since it contains much in the way of provisions of a
secondary policy level not essential to a fundamental charter of government. The book-length Constitution of Louisiana, after going through
a recent revision process, 26 remains as a document more than one hundred pages in length. The California instrument is longer. 27
Amendment and general revision of state constitutions are commonplaces. The accretion of provisions that might fairly be described
as legislative level in character bespeaks periodic revision. The trick,
for example, of getting a legislative policy, such as a commitment of
highway use and gasoline taxes to highway purposes as distinguished
from flow into the general fund, embedded in a state constitution is a
familiar denigration of representative government.2 8
V.

FISCAL DEPENDENCIES

The United States is fairly to be perceived as a political entity that
draws into its coffers a large fraction of the total national income, some
of which it spends directly for governmental operations and social services, and a very substantial fraction of which (some $80 billion) it
shares with state and local governments. Over time this brings about a
condition of dependence or one might say, euphemistically, of lopsided
interdependence.
The outer limits of the conditions that the United States may attach to federal grants or lending of credit to state and local governments have not been defined. Arguably there is no pressing need for
lines to be drawn in order to preserve genuine federalism since governmental recipients under this or that program voluntarily accept Washington's conditions. But a taxpayer has been found to have standing to
challenge federal aid to be used by local government in a way inconsistent with such express constitutional limitations as the establishment
clause of the first amendment.2 9 It remains to be seen whether the
courts will find unacceptable conditions that, as a practical matter, control state or local choice on political powers or governmental jurisdiction or structure.
26. The Louisiana Constitution was revised, effective midnight December 31, 1974, pursuant
to action of a constitutional convention. 1 LA. CONST. 153 (West 1977) (annotated version).
27. The California Constitution of 1879, as amended to July 1, 1954, occupied some 176
pages. 3 CAL. CoNST. 520 (West 1954).
28. For a relatively liberal example, see UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 13.
29. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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General federal revenue-sharing, a policy adopted in 1972,30 invites special comment. Use of the funds is not confined to any particular purpose or function. But the statute does require that a recipient
unit not engage in discrimination based on3 race, color, sex or national
origin in any of its activities or programs. '
This policy presents some interesting questions. Congress has used
taxation as a leveler to influence state policy on social legislation. 2
And, of course, it can condition the use of shared federal revenues.
General revenue-sharing could be used to influence state and local governments to coordinate their tax systems with those of the national government. Already federal law provides for federal collection of state
income taxes pursuant to formal agreement.3 3 Conceivably more studied coordination could achieve greater tax equity consistently with reasonably serving the needs of the several levels of government.
There is the approach of federal payments to local governments in
lieu of taxes. Congress has adopted this policy on payments to local
units in which lie federal lands not subject to state or local ad valorem
taxes.3 4 This is significant aid to units within the purview of the program, but it is not a major factor in overall revenue policy.
VI.

THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

While the concern here is with the convention method, the reader
is reminded both that initiation of action has been done exclusively by
Congress up to this point and has been done without any limitation
upon initiating competence.
We have had no experience with a federal constitutional convention since 1787. There have been some expressions of state interest
over the years, 5 and serious movements in that direction in recent
years. During the 1960s, state legislative applications for a convention
concerned with qualifying the force of the Supreme Court's one-per30. State and Local Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (codified at 31
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1265 (1976)).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (1976).
32. A particularly notable example was the imposition of a federal tax upon employers of
eight or more to bring about unemployment compensation on a national scale. The carrot was a
ninety per centum credit for participating employers. See Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937).
33. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6361-6365 (1976).
34. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1976).
35. See generally STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS.,
STATE APPLICATIONS ASKING CONGRESS TO CALL A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

(Comm. Print 1961).
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son-one-vote decisions affecting state and local representative bodies
fell one state short of the requisite two-thirds.3 6 Further reference will
be made to this in terms of substance. Here one invites attention to
process.
Both ratification of a proposed amendment originating in Congress and application by states to Congress for the call of a convention
are made expressly a function of state "legislatures" by article V. This
of gubernatorial or
covers the ground affirmatively to the exclusion
7
voter participation (the latter by referendum).1
There is no question but that Congress may set a time limit for
state ratification of an amendment initiated by Congress. 38 Whether a
legislature could rescind its application for a convention before the requisite applications by two-thirds of the legislatures is an open question.
A very recent, thorough study reached the conclusion that neither extension of the ratification period nor recognition of state rescission was
at odds with the basic values of article V.39 The disposition of its writer
was to leave decision with the Congress under the political questions
rubric. Of course, it is a matter of public knowledge that Congress has
taken a position by extending the period for ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment. Chief Justice Hughes, in writing the opinion of
the Court in Coleman v. Miller,4" did confirm support for the conception, previously embraced in Dillon v. Glass,4 of a reasonable time period grounded in the consideration that there should be sufficient
contemporaneousness to reflect the will of the people over the nation
generally at relatively the same period. Although this reasoning would
have reduced force with respect to a time limit set by Congress upon
state applications for an open convention since that body would not be
confined to particular areas of concern, Coleman lends support for the
political questions disposition.

VII.

FEDERAL CONVENTION SCOPE-OPEN OR LIMITED?

There is no limitation upon the initiating competence of Congress.
36. See generally Symposium on the Article V Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. REv. 837
(1968); Bonfield, The Dirksen Amendment andthe Article V Convention Process,id. at 949.
37. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920). The decision related to the referendum situation,

but the reasoning applies equally to the gubernatorial approach.
38. Dillon v. Glass, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
39. Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment andArticle V A FrameworkforAnalysis of the
Extension and Rescission Issues, 127 U. PENN. L. REv. 494 (1978).
40. 307 U.S. 433, 452 (1939).
41. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
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What basis is there for differentiating between Congress and a convention in this regard? A negative answer is consistent with the policy of
enabling the states to provoke action as to consideration of constitutional change. It is entirely consistent to recognize that particular state
concerns might provoke the call of a convention and to perceive a convention, once called, to be competent to consider matters other than
those that led to the call. In any event, even if the call were limited, the
convention might overrun the limits, as did the Convention of 1787,
which was called to propose revision of the Articles of Confederation. 2
The state cases largely support the view that a state constitutional
convention is not subject to procedural limitations. 43 As for substance,
one notes at once that there is impressive authority for the view that, at
the state level, limited constitutional conventions may be held without
express constitutional provision for them.' There is a distinction between a call of a limited convention by a state legislature and such a
call approved by the electorate. As to the latter; it45can be said that the
voice of the sovereign has imposed the limitation.
Is the state experience of weighty import with respect to the substantive limitations that might be imposed on a federal constitutional
convention? The electoral factor just mentioned would not be operative since it is not involved in the federal process. Article V bespeaks
legislative application to Congress for the call of a convention. The
42. On February 21, 1787, the unicameral Congress, existing under the Articles of Confederation, adopted a Resolve as follows:
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that on the second Monday
in May next a Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by the several
states, be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of
Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations
and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states,
render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government andthe preservation of the Union.
Report ofProceedingsin Congress, Wednesday, February21, 1787, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE
OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 44, 46 (C. Tansill ed. 1927).
Of course, it may be contended that the 1787 action is to be explained as the work of a
revolutionary body. To do this would be to say that the revolutionary condition and aura extended well beyond independence and several years of experience as a confederation. The Constitution was adopted by sovereign states that had been so for a number of years.
43. E.g., Pryor v. Lowe, 258 Ark. 188, 192, 523 S.W.2d 199, 202 (1975); Carlton v. Secretary
of State, 151 Mich. 337, 340, 115 N.W. 429, 430 (1908); see Levine, LimitedFederalConstitutional
Conventions:Implications ofthe State Experience, It HARV. J. LEGIS. 127, 133 (1973).
44. See Levine, supra note 43, at 131-42. The 1967-1968 Pennsylvania convention is a recent
example. The state constitution is silent as to constitutional conventions, but initiation of amendments by limited convention was upheld. Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406,250 A.2d 474 (1969), cert,
denied,395 U.S. 827 (1969).
45. See R. HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS, AND LIMITATIONS 120-21 (1917).
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provision is thought to have stemmed from concern that as components
in a federal system the states should be in a position to set in motion
machinery for possible changes in the federal organic charter considered to be to their interests as units in the federation.4 6 There was no
focus upon subject matter range.
The records of the 1787 Convention do not throw much direct
light upon the scope of the convention method of initiating amendments. The debates in the Convention, as edited by Jonathan Elliott,
disclose that at one stage the draft document called for action by Congress in proposing amendments either on its own motion or upon application of two-thirds of the legislatures of the states. Later the draft was
amended to require a convention on application of the legislatures of
two-thirds of the states.4 7 That resulted in the ultimate text of article V.
An argument can be made, as a matter of constitutional history,
that article V stands in contrast with the call of the 1787 Constitutional
Convention. The latter related expressly to "revision" of the Articles of
Confederation. The former speaks simply of a convention called for
"proposing amendments." Perhaps article V is not directed to thorough revision, but it surely places no express limitation upon the
number or nature of amendments that a convention might propose.
In 1974, a Special Constitutional Convention Study Committee of
the American Bar Association submitted a report in which appeared
the following paragraph:
The text of Article V demonstrates that a substantial national consensus must be present in order to adopt a constitutional amendment.
The necessity for a consensus is underscored by the requirement of a
two-thirds vote in each House of Congress or applications for a convention from two-thirds of the state legislatures to initiate an amendment, and by the requirement of ratification by three-fourths of the
states. From the language of Article V we are led to the conclusion
that there must be a consensus among the state legislatures as to the
subject matter of a convention before Congress is required to call
one. To read Article V as requiring such agreement helps assure
"that an alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to
the sentiment and felt needs of today. ...
46. ABA SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMM., AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION 11-12 (1974).
47. 2 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 251 (2d ed. 1836).
48. ABA SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMM., AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V, at 11 (1974) (quoting J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR HISTORY, POWERS AND MODES OF

PROCEEDING § 585, at 634 (4th ed. 1887)).
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This seems to say that there could not be a general convention
since the constitutional scheme bespeaks a consensus among the state
legislatures as to subject matter before Congress is required to call a
convention! But the report goes on to say expressly that general conventions are not precluded. 9
It is to be noted that the American experience has not embraced
the conception of a constitutional convention as a constituent assembly,
that is, a representative body with competence both to draft and to
adopt a charter of government or constitution, if you will. At the state
level, except for Delaware,50 the pattern is ratification by the voters. At
the federal level, as is well known, of course, state ratification is by
representatives, whether in a legislature or a constitutional convention
as determined by Congress under article V. The federal constitution
was ratified by state conventions as specified by the federal convention
of 1787 in article VII of the document.
In a number of states the initiative is available for constitutional
changes as well as for legislation." Of course, the current wave of populism 52 could move things in a positive legislative sense through resort
to the initiative at state and local levels. Some may desire it for the
national government, but one does not perceive it to be an innovation
at all likely to be adopted by federal constitutional amendment. A national referendum upon this or that proposed legislative measure of any
complexity would be about as vacuous an exercise as one could imagine.
It is in order to take particular note that even the legislatures are
joining in the expressions of distrust of representative government.
This is well-nigh the ultimate irony in an increasingly populous and
complex society.
As we pursue the matter of substantive reach of federal constitutional convention jurisdiction, it is in order to note afresh that, in historical perspective as well as theoretical perceptions of the nature of a
constitutional convention, such a body is deliberative in character.
Plainly Congress is a representative deliberative body that is not sub49. Id. at 18.

50. In Delaware, amendment is by the legislature in a process involving opportunity for public reaction between legislative sessions and before final action. DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § I.

51. California provides an example of the direct initiative process, which bypasses the legislature. CAL. CONsT. art. 18, § 3. Massachusetts, in contrast, has the indirect initiative, which
involves opportunity for legislative consideration and modification. MASS. CONST. §§ 159-161.
52. The overriding concern is with reducing the financial burdens imposed by government,
but the populist spirit reaches beyond this.
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ject to any identifiable substantive limitations in performing its function of initiating constitutional amendments. What basis is there for
saying that a convention would be any less so? Article V speaks in the
plural of a convention for proposing amendments. If either the applying states or the Congress may limit the subject matter reach of a convention, where do we draw the line? At the restrictive extreme was a
proposal of the 1960s, previously noted, calling for convention action
upon a proposed amendment concerning representation in state and
local bodies that left to convention determination only the issue of taking or leaving the proposed amendment in haec verba as submitted by
the state legislatures. Surely that treated a convention as a political
eunuch not worthy of its name. If convention scope may be narrowed
at all, would it not be the Congress with authority to do so?
So far as there might be a risk that convention action of a "farout" character would become reality, the states could say a negative
last word at the ratification stage.
While the Constitution does not exact that Congress lay down
ground rules in advance to govern the states in initiating the convention-calling process, there have been three recent, but abortive, moves
in this direction.53 It is noteworthy that the three bills dealt both with
state initiatory action and congressional response in calling a convention. Obviously Congress is free to take no action until sufficient state
applications are made. Were prospective regulation by Congress pursued, it could hardly be said to control willy-nilly since congressional
power to respond to an application for a convention would continue
undiminished.54
Senate Bill 215, introduced by Senator Ervin of North Carolina in
the First Session of the Ninety-Second Congress, went far beyond the
basics of providing for representation in a convention, funding and the
requisite supportive elements such as physical facilities, staff and other
needs of a deliberative body." It also undertook to regulate internal
organization and procedure as well as scope of substantive jurisdiction.
Surely it is implicit that a deliberative body concerned with the organic
law of a society have control of its organization and procedure.5 6 No
doubt Congress could provide for temporary organization to enable a
53. S. 215, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972); S. 623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2307, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
54. See Black, Amending the Constitution A Letter to a Congressman,82 YALE L.J. 189, 191-

92 (1972).
55. S. 215, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
56. The state cases support this position. See Levine, supra note 43.
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convention to organize itself for the conduct of its business. Senate Bill
215, however, went so far as to require that convention delegates take
an oath not to vote for any matter beyond the substantive scope of the
convention as a limited body. This is rather demeaning even if valid,
which is not granted. More substantial was a provision for final determination of whether there were in effect sufficient valid applications
"with respect to the same subject" by a concurrent resolution of the two
houses of Congress, which would also set forth "the nature of the
amendments" that the convention is called to consider. This would reject the open convention interpretation and thereby pose a serious constitutional question.
As to presidential participation, it is noted that all the bill called
for was a simple majority vote, whereas a two-thirds vote is required to
override a veto as well as for Congress to initiate a constitutional
amendment. That offsets a veto power, which a simple majority vote
obviously does not do.57
There has been a very significant change in the make-up of basic
legislative institutions. The reference, of course, is to representation
governed by the one-person-one-vote principle which, as to the lower
house of Congress, is derived from section 2 of article I of the Constitution 58 and, as to state legislatures and local governing bodies, is drawn
from the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 59 The
test at the federal level is very demanding: very little departure from
population equality will pass judicial muster.60 Fairly substantial
deviation from population equality in state and local representation
may be justified.6 '
Since the 1970 census, followed by congressional reapportionment
of congressional house seats among the states, there has been state redistricting effectuating apportionment in all states. At the state level,
Mississippi has recently concluded thirteen years of litigation over reapportionment of state legislative representation. In May of 1977, the
Supreme Court rejected for malapportionment a court-ordered plan
and sent the case back to the district court to devise a plan that would
57. See Committee on Federal Legislation, ProposedProceduresforFederal Constitutional
Conventions (S. 215), 27 REc. B. CiTy N.Y. 333 (1972).
58. The section provides for representatives "chosen every second Year by the People of the

several States." This is interpreted to call for one-person-one-vote. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
I, 7-8 (1964).
59. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
60. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-32 (1969).
61. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973).
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meet constitutional requirements. 62 The plan called for maximum population deviations of 16.5% in senate districts and 19.3% in house districts.63 Meanwhile, in August 1978, Mississippi sought federal court
approval of a statutory plan under the Voting Rights Act. 64 The Attorney General objected on the ground that the plan would dilute black
voting strength. Parties in the original case had agreed on a court-ordered plan and got it introduced in the Voting Rights Act case to show
it was more protective of black voting rights. This was after the plaintiffs in the original case had applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus ordering the district court to carry out the May 1977 order
of the High Court. On May 21, 1979, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of mandamus on a showing that the district court had
entered a final judgment ordaining a court-defined plan and elections
to be conducted in the coming summer on the understanding that there
would be no appeal.65 If nothing else, this Mississippi experience tells
us that it takes much more than constitutional adjudication to give living meaning to fundamental values in a political system.
What has been the significance of this legal revolution in terms of
the quality and performance of legislative bodies? Certainly it can be
said at once that confidence in representative government has not been
strengthened. California's Proposition 13 and its reverberation around
the land plainly tell us this. More particularly, what has been the effect
in terms of distribution of seats among political parties, as between rural and urban areas and as between suburbs and inner-city areas?
What differences in state policy formulation has the process brought
about?66 Are legislatures that are no longer malapportioned more sensitive to social problems? To urban problems broadly? To safeguarding of human rights? Are they more conservative by force of greater
representation for the relatively affluent people in suburban areas?
In making provision for a constitutional convention, would Congress be governed by the one-person-one-vote principle? The Constitution does not speak to the question. Although the bases for application
of the principle to the lower house of Congress and to state and local
62. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
63. Id. at 416-17.
64. This action was noted in Conner v. Coleman, 99 S. Ct. 1523 (1979). If upheld, the statutory plan would govern, as the Court here noted.

65. Conner v. Coleman, 99 S. Ct. 2400 (1979).
66. Political scientists have addressed this question. See, e.g., Uslander, Comparative State
Policy Formation,Interpar y Competition, andMalapportionment:A New Look at V O. Key's Hypothesis, 40 J. PoLtTics 409, 422-30 (1978).
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representative bodies are to be found in the provisions of the Constitution, that is not true of a convention. One would have to reach beyond
the Constitution to some sort of transcendent principle to apply oneperson-one-vote to a constitutional convention.
VIII.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION GRIST

Let us suppose that a constitutional convention were called and
that the correct view were that such a body is unrestricted as to what it
could propose. This invites speculation as to what the convention
might initiate as perceived positive changes.
A.

The Legislative Branch

In keeping with the spirit of the eighteen-year-old voting age,
might the minimum ages for election to the Senate and House of Representatives well be lowered? The perception that more senior people
in the Senate would serve as brakes upon more impulsive and radical
House members has not been validated by experience. There is support for the view that the Senate has been, on the whole, a more socialconscious body and certainly no less sensitive to issues of human rights.
Perhaps the security of six-year senatorial terms has a bearing here.
Is the two-year term pattern for House memberships too short?
Does this system tend to compromise independence through the demands of the reelection campaigns?
The speech or debate clause has been very liberally interpreted
within the bounds of what may constitute legislative action. 67 The protection reaches far beyond what is said in a legislative chamber.68 One
has heard no clamor for change. A possible modification would be to
apply qualified privilege, which means that the protection would not
cover conduct characterized by malice.
It might be noted here that without benefit of express constitu,tional provision the Supreme Court has upheld absolute privilege for
third-level administrative personnel. 69 This is something that could as
readily be changed by a decision according only qualified privilege.7 0
There are problems of separation of powers. In a number of states
67. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).

68. The protection covers aides of members for actions that would be immune if done by
members. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
69. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

70. This position is the one Chief Justice Warren thought should have been taken in Barr v.
Matteo. Id. at 583-84 (dissenting opinion).
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the executive power of veto includes the power to veto items in appropriation measures. 7 1 In some, the governor may reduce items. 72 This
makes particular sense as to lump sum appropriations. At the federal
level, there is no item veto. Mr. Nixon sought to achieve somewhat the
effect of an item veto by so-called impoundment-nonspending--of
appropriated funds. The congressional response was enactment of a
measure affording Congress the last word.7 3 Of course, the item veto
could be established by constitutional amendment.
The President has a pocket veto, that is, he can pocket a bill and
let it die if Congress adjourns before the ten-day period for Presidential
action runs out.7 4 He can sign a bill after
adjournment sine die as long
5
as he acts within the ten-day period.
What is "adjournment" for pocket veto purposes? Certainly under
the decisions adjournment at the end of a session or of a Congress is
such. And the High Court has held that a formal veto by return of a
bill with a veto message to a designated officer of the house of origin
during a recess for not over three days is effective.76 In 1974, Senator
Edward Kennedy won a significant test case in which he was recognized as having standing to sue to protect his vote on a bill which had
been approved almost unanimously in both houses. There was a fiveday adjournment of the Senate, the house of origin, which ran out three
days after the ten-day period for Presidential action. Although the Secretary of the Senate was designated as the officer to receive return of a
bill during the recess, the President simply "pocketed" the bill. Nevertheless, the bill
was held to have been enacted in the absence of an
77
effective veto.
There is something to be said for extending the period allotted the
President for action upon a bill. The President, it is true, is likely to
know at the time an important measure is passed whether it merits executive approval, but that is not necessarily the case. Certainly the demands of the office are almost overwhelming. One approach would be
to afford more time and eliminate the pocket veto entirely.
71. E.g., UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 8. North Carolina stands alone as a state that does not

accord the governor the power of veto.
72. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 9.
73. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-334, 88
Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1407 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979)).
74. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
75. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932).

76. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
77. Kennedy v. Sampson, 364 F. Supp. 1075 (D.D.C. 1973), af'd, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976).
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A major separation of powers problem area that has become increasingly active is presented by Congressional resort to veto in reverse.
The subject has been examined recently in an excellent article by Professor Robert Dixon, which appeared in the pages of this review.7" It
has, moreover, gotten thoughtful consideration in other journals. 9
Were there to be an open constitutional convention, the subject would
be very likely grist for that mill.
"Lay-over" provisions are readily distinguishable from veto in reverse. They delay effectiveness of executive or administrative action to
afford Congress time to act on the subject through normal legislative
processes.80
This writer is emboldened to articulate a very simplistic view of
the subject. The suggestion is that Congress may take action that has
the force of law only through the legislative process pursued in both
houses. Certainly as to a measure originating within the Congress, action by one house does not make law. At the same time, it must be said
that it is just as much the internal legislative process to reject a "measure" as to approve or adopt one.
Let us take the determination of federal salaries as an example of
veto in reverse. That federal salaries are appropriate subjects for legislative action is clear enough: section 6 of article I of the Constitution
provides expressly that the compensation of members of Congress shall
be "ascertained by law." Does this leave Congress free to act on the
subject in a manner other than the traditional process of enactment?
By an act of 1967, Congress made provision for a nine-member
commission of which three, including the chairman, were to be appointed by the President, two of whom would be designated by the
Chief Justice of the United States, two appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and two named by the President of the Senate.8 ' Under the act, the commission makes recommendations to the
President as to rates of pay for high-level offices and positions in all
78. Dixon, The CongressionalVeto and Separation of Powers."The Executive on a Leash, 56
N.C.L. REv. 423 (1977). Professor Dixon cites other commentaries in id. at 425 n. 11.
79. See Bruff& Gellhorn, CongressionalControl ofd4dministrativeRegulation.',4Study oLegislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the
Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAnalysis,52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455 (1977). Senator Javits may be
identified as an ardent advocate of veto in reverse.
80. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (upholding congressional authority to
delegate power to regulate federal courts and the reservation by Congress of the power to examine
proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before they become effective).
81. Act of Dec. 16, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 225, 81 Stat. 642 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1976)).
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three branches, and the President makes his recommendations, with the
benefit of the commission report, to Congress. Presidential recommendations, under the 1967 provision, became effective unless Congress
legislated differently or either house disapproved of all or part of such
recommendations. The Court of Claims upheld this veto in reverse in a
case in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari.8 2 In 1977, the act
was amended to require that both houses approve the salary recommendations by majority vote for them to become effective.83
Veto in reverse with respect to administrative rulemaking is another aspect of separation of powers that is very troubling. In the extrapolation of policy under regulatory statutes there is a strongly
confirmed practice of delegating rather broad rulemaking authority to
agencies or officers in the executive branch or to "independent agencies" that tend to straddle the line between the legislative and executive
branches. The theory supporting delegation to both types of agencies is
basically the same-governing policy is set by law and administrative
rulemaking and application are means of effectuating legislative policy.
Even though much that is to be found in administrative regulations
clearly could be enacted in the first instance by Congress, single house
veto of administrative regulations is quite another thing. If it is to be
justified as legislative action, then we have congressional action intended to be of legal force without submission to the executive for approval or veto.
An important legislative responsibility short of veto in reverse is
legislative oversight. This, of course, is a recognized function of standing committees. The objects are to keep departments and agencies
charged with the administration and enforcement of legislation in the
qui vive and to gain information relevant to legislative policymaking.
Both the charging and adjudicating functions of impeachment reside, as we all know, in the legislative branch. The process does not
82. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 718 (1978).
Here the writer presumes to add a personal note. He was appointed to the first panel of the
commission but declined to serve not on the basis of an objection to veto in reverse, but because
he would not take a then generally required test oath. Since then the oath requirement has been
held unconstitutional under the first amendment. Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610
(D.D.C. 1969).
83. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19,
§ 401(a), 91 Stat. 39 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 359 (Supp. 1 1977)). Obviously this is calculated to
neutralize the contention that Presidential veto power is, in effect, denied. It embraces Presidential approval in advance. But it affords no Presidential review of inaction or negative action by
the two houses.
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apply to members of Congress. 4 Rather, each house is given the power
to discipline or expel its own members.8 5 A much-mooted question is
whether a Senate judgment of impeachment is subject to judicial review. Jurisdiction to try is vested in the Senate, and there is no express
provision for review.86 Whether there might be collateral attack is a
more open question. The challenge might rest upon a contention that
the proceeding resulted in a conviction upon a ground not specified in
the Constitution. In any event, a constitutional convention could propose changes in relation to both grounds and review.
B.

The Executive Branch

There is now before the Ninety-Fifth Congress a joint resolution
proposing a constitutional amendment designed to replace the electoral
college system with direct popular election of the President and VicePresident. The proposal is democratic in thrust but there is opposition
based upon concern for federalism. The concern, simplistically put,
centers upon the removal of the states-the less populous ones in particular-as important factors in the presidential election process. Proponents focus attack upon the so-called unit rule that assigns all of the
electoral votes in a state to the winner in the statewide popular vote.
The policy-tension is severe. While the states are represented as such
in both houses of the Congress, the unit rule arguably has no place in
Presidential elections because the President represents all of us.
Should the President be confined to a single term of four or six
years? Obviously a President's actions are likely to be influenced by
concern over reelection. On the other hand, six years may be seen as a
long term for a President who does not turn out well.
The appointing power of the President has been qualified by usage
that is quite removed from the constitutional text. This has been conspicuously the case with respect to appointments of judges and United
States Attorneys. Here we confront an old and strongly entrenched
practice, known as senatorial courtesy, which gives senators influential
voice in appointments to federal office, primarily in their states. The
Constitution merely calls for participation by the Senate as a body.
President Carter has undertaken to temper political influence in these
84. The congressional precedent set in the case of Senator Blount of Tennessee in the 1790s

still holds. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 214 (1973).
85. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5.
86. See Fordham, Book Review, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 673, 680 (1974) (R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

(1973)).
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matters by creating panels or commissions charged with receiving, considering and rating applications for federal judgeships as an aid to
Presidential nominating action. This may lessen political influence but
the problem is not very tractable, given human nature and the political
factor. The subject might well engage the attention of a constitutional
convention.
Should the constitutional grant of the pardoning power of the
President be reexamined? President Ford granted Mr. Nixon a blanket
pardon for all offenses against the United States that he may have committed while President, without regard to whether there had been prosecution or conviction. This was not ordinary clemency, and there is the
danger that such action might be extended to lesser officers as well.
The question of the reach of the pardoning power is acute in a case
such as that of Mr. Nixon. Should a President, the chief law enforcement officer of the United States, be able to avoid both impeachment
and prosecution by resigning and obtaining white-washing by a successor of his own designation, as the Vice-President normally is?
An area of extreme difficulty and current debate is the distribution
of authority and responsibility with respect to foreign relations. Were
there an open constitutional convention, should an effort be made to
deal with the subject by constitutional amendment?
A treaty entered into under the authority of the United States is
the supreme law of the land. The pertinent constitutional provision
was given effect by the Supreme Court as early as 1797 in a case in
which it was held that a treaty overrode a Virginia confiscation law. 7
During the 1950s, there was a movement to achieve a constitutional
amendment, which was articulated in a resolution popularly identified
with the name of Senator John Bricker of Ohio, that would allow a
treaty effect as internal law in the United States only through legislation that would be valid in the absence of treaty. After debate, a substitute motion failed by one vote. A chief proponent was the American
Bar Association. That organization was opposed by a national citizens'
committee in which lawyers played leading roles. It is a matter for
speculation whether the Bricker effort would be revived were there a
constitutional convention.88
87. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1797).
88. One notes with anecdotal interest that the famous migratory bird decision in Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), which upheld regulatory legislation implementing a migratory bird
treaty with Canada, was decided in the year John Bricker graduated from law school. Of course,
Congress may exercise authority under the necessary and proper clause to implement a treaty by
statute as it did in the instance of the migratory bird treaty.
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Of immediate current interest are questions concerning the extent
of the power of the President to attach conditions to the recognition of
foreign states or governments. It is well accepted that recognition is a
Presidental power, although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution. Recognition expressed in an executive agreement may embrace
terms that prevail over state law concerning the disposition of interests
of foreign nationals in this country.89 An agreement as to imports,
however, has been held not to prevail under a federal statute based on
the commerce power." What is to be said of commitments for defense
or otherwise affecting a foreign political entity? If the matter is governed by a treaty that does not grant the President powers of termination or modification, does the President, nevertheless, have competence
to act by force of his position as the nation's representative in foreign
affairs?
The Vietnam War was an undeclared, large-scale conflict, the legality of which is still a matter of debate. No case presenting the question was decided by the Supreme Court. The power to declare war is
plainly vested in the Congress. It is equally clear that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces may respond to attack without awaiting congressional action. In the War Powers Resolution,
adopted by Congress in 1973, over the veto of the President, the reach
of executive authority was declared to be as follows:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1)a declaration
of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon9 the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. 1
It may well be said that the constitutional scheme now rests and
should continue to rest ultimate
responsibility and authority in the rep92
people.
the
of
resentatives
C. The JudicialBranch
Should the constitutional dispensation of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts be reexamined? No doubt the most serious concern here
has to do with the posture of the Supreme Court. Is the present system
89.
90.
91.
92.

United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
United States v. Guy W. Capps Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953).
War Powers Resolution, § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1976).
This is in substantial part a matter of control of the purse.
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such that the Court is overburdened? Even if the answer is in the affirmative, is the problem one that cannot be dealt with effectively short
of constitutional change? As is well known, these questions have been
the subject of a good deal of study and discussion. About all one ventures to say here is that were there an open constitutional convention,
no proposed amendment that would deny access to the High Court in a
way that would not leave the Court free to exercise the full scope of
jurisdiction now vested in it should be embraced. In this the writer is
taking the view of the late Chief Justice Earl Warren. The historic
commitment in the American political system to judicial review demands no less.
One way to attempt to counter decisions of the Supreme Court
that stir criticism is for Congress to exercise its authority to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. In matters over
which the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction, the Court
is granted appellate jurisdiction "with such exceptions and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make."93 During the 1950s, concern
about national security led to the introduction of a measure to exclude
from the Court's appellate jurisdiction matters involving national security, which had been the subject of decisions of the Court that were
displeasing to the proponents of the measure. Senate Bill 2646 of the
Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, failed of enactment.94 Speaking
in opposition before a Senate subcommittee, the writer had this to say:
I suggest .
that members of the legal profession, above all
others, should be sensitive to the need of preserving the integrity of
the judicial process at all levels, particularly the highest. Free criticism of the decisions of our courts is a thoroughly wholesome and
desirable thing. This, however, is a far cry from seeking to reduce
the jurisdiction of the Court in order to see to it that it cannot do
again what some people might regard-as highly erroneous or ill-advised. To proceed in this latter manner is, in substance, to impugn
the integrity of the judicial process. I find this insupportable. It is
obvious that the cases which ultimately come to decision on the merits in the Supreme Court of the United States are likely to involve
very controversial issues, not subject to decision with mathematical
certainty. Thus, no matter where the Court comes out, there is likely
to be a substantial body of adverse opinion with respect to a decision
in a case of great moment. I do not need to labor the distinction
between the studious and restrained consideration of the proper distribution of judicial business and the subjecting of the court to politi93. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
94. S.2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
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It is self-defeating for the people in a free society to withdraw the jurisdiction of an arm of government because some members take a critical
96
view of particular actions involving the exercise of that jurisdiction.
D. Human Rights
Is there ground for apprehension that an open constitutional convention would initiate action eroding the constitutional safeguards of
human rights as those safeguards have been authoritatively interpreted
by the Supreme Court? It should be noted at once that there is no
assumption that this is a concern simply on the part of liberals as distinguished from conservatives. In the larger perspective, it is the concern of all.
Doubtless the largest issue that might be raised in convention
would be whether to reject or modify expressly the judicial incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights safeguards into the fourteenth amendment under the theory that the due process clause of that amendment
assures, as against state action, fundamental rights described by Cardozo as those human rights that are basic to ordered liberty.9 7 The
rejection might be made on a wholesale basis or eclectically. National
as opposed to local values would be involved.
A likely area of reexamination is the separation of church and
state required by the establishment clause of the first amendment.
There is much interest in obtaining government financial support, in
one form or another, for religiously affiliated schools. The historic perception has been that in the long view the separation principle is in the
best interest of religion since it protects religious associations and institutions against political action. It is noted, at the same time, that
problems of regulation and taxation of religious organizations continue
to confront American society. There is no question but that some organizations operating under the banner of religion can and do engage in
95. Limitation of Appellate Jurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court: Hearings on S.
2646 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administrationof the InternalSecurity Act and Other
Internal Security Laws ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1958)
(statement of Jefferson B. Fordham).
96. A current move by Senator Helms of North Carolina again poses a threat to the "integrity of the judicial process." See S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11, 125 CONG. R c. S. 4157 (daily
ed. Apr. 9, 1979).
97. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
To be noted here also is the High Court's enunciation of the policy that federal courts in the
District of Columbia have competence to invalidate action that, if taken by a state, would deny
equal protection of the laws. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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practices involving financial and other exploitation of individuals quite
at odds with conventional moral standards.
Tax exemption of property of religious organizations is plainly a
form of subsidy and may be questioned since it involves the donation
of public services. One justification is that religious organizations do
good works and promote the pursuit of values cherished by organized
society.98 Is property tax exemption of church property used for religious purposes any less a subsidy in the form of governmental services
than would be cash grants to be used to pay for those services either
directly or indirectly through the payment of tax bills? Proliferation of
religious organizations with large property and financial interests
presents problems for organized society that cannot be ignored.
What has just been said is not to suggest that the first amendment
be revised or amended. There is room for the view that legitimate interpretation in relation to the dynamics of national experience can
serve effectively both the individual and social values at stake.
The implementing sections of the post-Civil War amendments are
the authority for legislation that has come to be the basis for effectuation of equal rights on a national scale. They are akin to the necessary
and proper clause in granting broad legislative jurisdiction to effectuate
the purposes of the amendments. Thus Congress can require, for example, nondiscrimination in public accommodations or submission of
proposed annexation of territory in a municipality with a record of racial inequality in the electoral process for review by the Attorney General and a district court of the United States with respect to possible
discrimination. Such legislation gives living force to the primary provisions found in the Constitution.99
The judicial experience with the first amendment guaranty of free
speech and press has brought us, in relation to obscenity, to the Miller
doctrine'00 that accords controlling force to "contemporary community
standards."' 01 In a very real sense, this accords different meanings to
the Constitution from one community to another. Persons earnestly
concerned with obscenity as a social problem might wish to modify the
first amendment to allow wider scope for regulation, but the risk of
getting something that is overdrawn at the expense of free expression
would be great.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
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The wording of the grand jury provision of the fifth amendment
stresses its character as a shield as contrasted with a sword.' 2 Doubtless some lessening of secrecy, as by allowing an individual under scrutiny the right to presence of counsel and of cross-examination, would
be consistent with the clause as it stands. But to allow the alternative of
charging by information of the prosecuting officer would be a substantial change not of a shielding nature.
The action of the Supreme Court in upholding the use of even
transactional immunity' 03 as an enforced trade-off for the privilege
against self-incrimination has not stirred approbation in all quarters. It
is literally at odds with the unqualified language of the fifth amendment. There should be no support for any movement to conform the
fifth amendment wording to the interpretive decision. Problems
presented by organized crime are serious, but we are talking about a
basic general principle.
Capital punishment is a controversial subject in our troubled society. There are those who would ban it outright, and there are others
who would both insist upon capital punishment and at the same time
outlaw nontherapeutic abortions by constitutional amendment, as well
as eschew gun regulation. Historically it is plain enough that capital
punishment is not per se a cruel andunusual punishment. If, however,
the subject is to be reexamined at the constitutional level, why should
not the most serious consideration be given to banning such a sanction?
At this writing individuals are being executed in Iran in the most summary fashion. What kind of system of values leads people to act in that
way, least of all in the name of religion? On what rational or moral
basis can the state be freely eclectic in its respect for human life? The
eighth amendment is, of course, subject to amendment, which might be
to ban capital punishment.
IX.

THE TAXPAYER UPRISING

The tax limitation and budget balance fever that is endemic in the
land is understandable but nevertheless troubling because it is generated by misconceptions concerning both objectives and methods. What
sense does it make to impose severe restrictions, the consequences of
which cannot be foreseen, and then try to adjust to them as unhappy
102. In the celebrated case of United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 380
U.S. 935 (1965), as it turned out, the grand jury was the sword and the Attorney General the
shield.
103. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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results are experienced? What comes first is a well-considered identification of what society wishes to be done in the public sector. The second thing that has to be done is to make a soundly conceived
distribution of responsibility and Authority within the total governmental complex; the third is to provide the means required to get the job of
government done. Such a comprehensive reexamination could be conducted by an official study commission-something far short of a constitutional convention. The undertaking would be well-nigh
overwhelming, but there is need that it be done. These statements are
almost embarrassingly simplistic, but their point so clearly should be
borne in mind at this time that it must be made. It is long since time to
take an overview. Political action could be reserved. Meanwhile, the
placing of fixed limitations upon public revenue raising or spending, or
both, forces choices on substantive matters that are likely to be quite
arbitrary.
For a hundred years and more, the American states have undertaken to keep local units of government within fiscal bounds by constitutional limitations upon borrowing and taxing."° Yet during that
period considerable ingenuity has been exercised in avoiding such limitations. Conspicuous examples in the area of local finance are resort to
revenue bonds, payable from the revenues of revenue-producing facilities, 0 5 and to special districts and overlapping units.0 6 The lesson this
experience provides is that formal limitations do not serve very effectively in controlling response to felt need. Moreover, in terms of performing public functions well, devices like special districts not
uncommonly are used in ways that do not relate governmental jurisdiction and performance rationally to the reach of human community and
service needs.
This commentator has nothing good to say about the ponderous
general property tax beyond recognizing that it is a very substantial
revenue producer. Fortunately it has no place at the national level; a
104. A limitation upon borrowing operates, in effect, as a limitation upon debt service taxation. An example of a rather special constitutional limitation is found in North Carolina. A local
unit may incur debt in any fiscal year in excess of two-thirds of the amount by which its debt has
been reduced during the next preceding year only if approved by a vote of the people of the unit.
N.C. CONST. art. V, § 4. Texas is an example of a state that has express constitutional limitations

upon both local borrowing and taxing. TEX. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 4, 5.
105. See generally Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 395 (1942).
106. The most conspicuous special districts are the well-nigh ubiquitous school districts. In
addition to them are districts, small and large, for a wide range of purposes, the creation of many
of which may be achieved under statutory authority as a matter of local decisionmaking without
regard to how they will fit into the larger community context.
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direct federal tax must be apportioned among the states according to
population. 10 7 Moreover, the property tax is not a major factor at the
state level. If it is to be retained on the local level, that should be done
on a basis that permits rational decisionmaking in terms of meeting the
costs of government and achieving something approaching a fair distribution of burden.
At this point we come back to the Proposition 13 syndrome. That
constitutional amendment placed an aggregate limitation upon property taxes imposed by all California governmental entitites upon any
unit of taxable property of one per centum of assessed valuation, except
for debt service levies or special assessments to pay principal and interest upon indebtedness approved by the voters prior to the time Proposition 13 took effect. Resort to other forms of local taxation is largely
foreclosed by a section that authorizes a "special" local unit tax, except
taxes on real property, only by a vote of two-thirds of the qualified
electors of a unit. Presumably "qualified" means persons eligible to
vote and not simply those voting. This is practically a prohibition.
State policy requiring that state and local governments operate
within the fiscal limits of balanced budgets is commendably prudent.
This is not to eschew some allowance for emergencies, nor is it to say
that the policy be given constitutional status. Even though the states
have the reserved powers of government in the federal system, the realities of the governmental scheme of things place the national government in the position to serve the commonwealth on a basis as wide as
the national domain in a highly interdependent state of affairs. In this
perspective, it is plain enough that there should not be rigid constitutional limitations upon the fiscal powers of the national government,
which affect the well-being of the whole society. This is not to say that
Congress on its own should not try to achieve a balanced budget.
Of course, it can be urged that exceptions might be made for critical needs like national defense. But there can be very pressing domestic concerns. A mild brake might be created by a constitutional
requirement of an extraordinary vote in both houses of Congress-say,
two-thirds of the total membership-to spend beyond the limits of the
budget.
There are obvious differences between the national and state governments with respect to finance. The former has a panoply of fiscal
powers, the exercise of which bears upon the social and economic well107. 2 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, para. 4.
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being of the whole society. Those powers comprehend taxation, spending for the general welfare, borrowing, providing a currency and, for
public and private financial institutions, exaction of charges for services
and for regulatory purposes. Policy involved in the exercise of those
powers is not directed simply toward support of government and its
operations. There is an essentially regulatory function that is inescapable. To tie Uncle Sam's fiscal hands behind his back to keep him
from hurting himself (meaning all of us) would be self-defeating.
State legislators who clamor for a constitutional requirement of a
balanced federal budget are not only exhibiting lack of faith in the very
process to which their offices commit them but are inviting drastic reduction in federal aid to state and local governments, a source of funds
that now runs to some eighty billion dollars per fiscal year. Certainly
that would be a most likely area for budget-cutting. The real challenge
is to do a better job within the existing scheme of things.
X.

CONCLUSION

While citizens of conservative outlook may be apprehensive about
an open constitutional convention, the greater threat perceived in this
quarter is to the cause of human rights and responsibilities. This is a
period in which the spirit of reaction is strong in the land. Materialistic

values occupy a high place in the public mind. Restrictions upon fiscal
powers of government at all levels are objectives with much stronger

public appeal than a constitutional amendment assuring equal rights to
women. The genus is widely perceived not as trustee for all of nature
but as self-serving exploiter of the total organic and inorganic scheme

of things.
The establishment clause is under attack by those who would
make the public school system a facilitator of sectarian religious practices. There are unceasing efforts to extend the already major contribution of organized society to religious institutions of one sort or another.
The case against the adoption of constitutional provisions imposing restrictions upon the fiscal powers of the national government is
very compelling. Let us focus particularly upon a requirement that
there be a balanced budget.
1. The fatal infirmity of such a limitation is that it is
squarely at odds with the role of the national government in
the life of the nation. Even if we took a simplistic view of the
government as a unit raising and spending money in order to
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do its job of performing public functions and providing public
services, the pervasive interrelationships with the general economic and social well-being of the nation would have to be
recognized. With a nod to the libertarians, in a nuclear age,
with all the other risks and interdependencies that attend the
human condition, it must be said there is no prospect of diminution of the roles of organized society. In a nation-state,
both external and internal concerns have their demands.
2. It is inconceivable that a balanced budget requirement could rationally be made hard and fast. There must be
recognition of military and other emergencies.
3. It is likely that a requirement of a balanced federal
budget would operate to the severe disadvantage of the states
and local units. Certainly general revenue sharing would be
an obvious target. There are differences of opinion as to the
wisdom of general revenue sharing. That may be left to independent examination, but the substantial financial considerations are not to be ignored here.
4. If state and local experience is to be heeded, federal
fiscal limitations would stand as something to be avoided or
circumvented by one or another ingenious device that would
bring about outlay beyond the formal limits.
The question not to be evaded is whether we are serious about
making representative government work.

